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Abstract 
In this paper we present a propositional 
logic programming language for reasoning 
under possibilistic uncertainty and represent­
ing vague knowledge. Formulas are repre­
sented by pairs (ip, a), where ip is a many­
valued proposition and a E [0, 1] is a lower 
bound on the belief on ip in terms of necessity 
measures. Belief states are modeled by pos­
sibility distributions on the set of all many­
valued interpretations. In this framework, (i) 
we define a syntax and a semantics of the gen­
eral underlying uncertainty logic; (ii) we pro­
vide a modus ponens-style calculus for a sub­
language of Horn-rules and we prove that it 
is complete for determining the maximum de­
gree of possibilistic belief with which a fuzzy 
propositional variable can be entailed from a 
set of formulas; and finally, (iii) we show how 
the computation of a partial matching be­
tween fuzzy propositional variables, in terms 
of necessity measures for fuzzy sets, can be 
included in our logic programming system. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Logic programming languages have been applied to a 
wide range of areas such as Artificial Intelligence or 
Deductive Databases. Among these languages, Prolog 
is the most representative but it is not powerful enough 
for reasoning and representing knowledge in situations 
where there is vague, incomplete or imprecise informa­
tion. To overcome this problem, new logic program­
ming languages have been developed. They are based 
on a variety of non-standard logics such as multiple­
valued logics [Ishizuka and Kanai, 1985; Mukaidono et 
al., 1989; Li and Liu, 1990; Alsinet and Manya, 1996; 
Vojtas, 1998], possibilistic logic [Dubois et al., 1991], 
probabilistic logic [Heinsohn, 1994; Lukasiewicz, 1998], 
evidential logic [Baldwin, 1987; Baldwin et al., 1995] or 
fuzzy operator logic [Weigert et al., 1993]. Depending 
on the underlying logic some systems are more suit­
able for dealing with vague knowledge, while others 
Lluis Godo 
AI Research Inst. (IliA) 
CSIC 
08193 Bellaterra, Spain 
godo@iiia.csic.es 
are more appropriate for reasoning under incomplete 
or imprecise knowledge. Although all of the fuzzy ex­
tensions of logic programming implement proof proce­
dures for fuzzy reasoning, only some of them allow to 
represent ill-known information in the language. 
Our first objective in this paper is to define a proposi­
tional logic programming language for reasoning under 
possibilistic uncertainty and representing vague knowl­
edge. We represent formulas by pairs (ip, a), ip being a 
many-valued proposition built on fuzzy propositional 
variables and a E [0, 1] being a lower bound on the 
belief on ip in terms of necessity measures. 
On the one hand, fuzzy propositional variables pro­
vide us a suitable representation model in situations 
where there is vague, incomplete or imprecise infor­
mation about the real world. For instance, the fuzzy 
statement "Peter is abouL35 years old" can be nicely 
represented by the fuzzy proposition Peter _is_about35 
defined over the finite domain years_old. In the case 
abouL35 denotes a crisp interval of ages, the above 
proposition can be interpreted as "3x E about35 such 
that Peter is x years old". In the case abouL35 denotes 
a fuzzy interval with a membership function /-Labout-35, 
the above proposition can be interpreted in possibilis­
tic terms as "3x E [P,abouL35]a such that Peter is x 
years old is certain with a necessity of at least 1 - a" 
for each a E [0, 1], where [!-LabouL35]a denotes the a-cut 
of /-Labout-35. So, fuzzy propositions can be seen as 
(flexible) restrictions on an existential quantifier (see 
[Dubois et al., 1998]). 
On the other hand, since we want to deal with fuzzy 
propositional variables in the language, the truth eval­
uation of formulas cannot be Boolean but many­
valued, and thus, our possibilistic logic programming 
language should be based on a many-valued logic as 
in [Alsinet et al., 1999]. Moreover, like in classi­
cal propositional logic programming systems, the lan­
guage should enable us to define an efficient proof 
method based on a complete calculus for determin­
ing the maximum degree of possibilistic belief with 
which a fuzzy propositional variable can be entailed 
from a set of formulas. To this end, first we define 
a general possibilistic logic based on the propositional 
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Godel fuzzy logic and then, we focus our attention on 
the possibilistic language that results from considering 
the Horn-rule sublogic of Godel fuzzy logic. 
The reason for choosing Godel logic as the underlying 
many-valued logic where to model fuzziness is two-fold: 
first, truth-functions of Godel logic are purely ordinal, 
that is, they are definable just from the ordering of the 
truth scale (see next section), no further algebraic op­
erations are required, and thus the use of this logic is in 
accordance with the simplest understanding, in terms 
of an ordering, of what a fuzzy, gradual property can 
be; and second, and non negligible at all, Godel logic 
has been proved to be fully compatible with an already 
proposed and suitable extension of necessity measures 
for fuzzy events, in the sense that Godel logic will al­
low to define a well behaved and featured possibilistic 
semantics on top of it (see Sections 3 and 4). 
Our second objective is to extend the possibilistic logic 
programming language with a partial matching mech­
anism between fuzzy propositional variables based on 
a necessity-like measure. As we have recently proved 
in [Alsinet and Godo, 2000b], this extension preserves 
completeness for a particular class of formulas. In our 
opinion, this is a key feature that justifies by itself the 
interest of such a logic programming system. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we 
present the syntax and the many-valued semantics of 
the language of propositional Godel fuzzy logic. In 
Section 3 we extend the language to allow possibilistic 
reasoning. In Section 4 we describe the uncertainty 
sublogic that our proof method can deal with and we 
prove that it is complete for determining the maximum 
degree of possibilistic entailment of fuzzy propositional 
variables. In Section 5, we show how the proof method 
can be extended to allow a semantical matching be­
tween fuzzy propositional variables. And, finally, in 
the last section we discuss some related work. Be­
cause of the lengthy proofs, proofs of propositions can 
be found in [Alsinet and Godo, 2000a]. 
2 MANY-VALUED SEMANTICS: 
GODEL LOGIC 
Following [Hajek, 1998], the language of propositional 
Godel fuzzy logic (denoted hereafter G) is built in the 
usual way from a (countable) set of propositional vari­
ables, a conjunction A, an implication -t and the truth 
constant 0. Further connectives are defined as follows: 
<p V 'ljJ is ((<p -t 'If;) -t 'If;) 1\ (('If; -t <p) -t <p) 
•<p is <p -t 0 
<p=:'lj; is (<p-t'lj;)l\('1/;-t<p) 
The semantics of G is given by interpretations I of the 
propositional variables into the real unit interval [0, 1] 
which are extended to arbitrary formulas by means of 
the following rules: 
I(O) = 0 
I(<pi\'1/J) 
I(<p -t'lj;) 
min(I(<p), I( 'If;)) 
{ 1, if I(<p) � I('lj;) 
I ( 'ljJ), otherwise 
For the derived connectives the truth-interpretations 
take these forms: 
max(I(<p), I( 'If;)) 
{ 1, if I ( <p) = 0 
0, otherwise 
{ 1, if I(<p) = I('lj;) 
min(I(<p), I('lj;)), otherwise 
The following is an axiomatization1 of G: 
(A1) (<p -t '1/J) -t (('1/J -t x) -t (<p -t x)) 
(A2) (<pl\'lj;)-t<p 
(A3) (<p 1\ 'If;) -t ('If; 1\ <p) 
(A4) (<p 1\ (<p -t 'If;)) -t ('If; 1\ ('If; -t <p)) 
(AS) (<p -t ('1/J -t x)) = ((<p A '1/J) -t x) 
(A6) ((<p -t '1/J) -t x) -t ((('1/J -t <p) -t x) -t x) 
(A7) 0 -t <p 
(A8) <p -t <p 1\ <p 
The deduction rule of G is modus ponens. The no­
tion of proof is as usual. Completeness for G reads as 
follows: <p is provable in G, written f-a <p, iff I(<p) = 1 
for any interpretation I. Furthermore, G enjoys strong 
completeness as well. Namely, let T be an arbitrary 
theory over G, i.e. just a set of formulas. An inter­
pretation I is a model ofT iff I( 'If;) = 1 for all 'ljJ E T. 
Then, T proves <p, written T f- <p, iff I(<p) = 1 for any 
interpretation I which is a model ofT. 
3 GENERAL POSSIBILISTIC 
REASONING OV ER GODEL 
LOGIC 
We have seen that fuzzy propositional variables are 
suitable for representing imprecise information as in 
the statement "Peter is abouL35 years old". Now, 
we are interested in extending the fuzzy propositional 
language to allow fuzzy reasoning under uncertainty 
which leads us to a more expressive language. For in­
stance, the statement "it is almost sure that Peter is 
abouL35 years old" is represented in this setting by a 
certainty-weighted fuzzy proposition 
(Peter _is_about35, 0.9), 
where the certainty value 0.9 expresses how much is 
believed the fuzzy statement "Peter is abouL35 years 
old" in terms of necessity measures. 
In general, certainty weights are employed to model 
statements of the form "<p is a-certain", where <p repre­
sents vague, incomplete or imprecise knowledge about 
the real world. In this framework, this is formalized 
1 Actually, logic G is equivalent to the extension of lntu­
itionistic logic with the pre-linearity axiom ( <p -t 1/J) V ( 1/J -t 
<p). 
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as "rp is certain with a necessity of at least a" and is 
represented through a certainty-weighted Godel logic 
formula (rp, a). 
Within the possibilistic model of uncertainty, belief 
states are modeled by normalized possibility distribu­
tions 1r : I -+ [0, 1] on a set of interpretations I. In 
the standard possibilistic logic, the uncertainty about 
whether a (Boolean) formula holds true or not is esti­
mated by the necessity measure 
N([rp]l 1r) 
= 
inf{1-1r(I) I IE I, I(r.p) = 0}. 
However, in our framework and according to the pre­
vious subsection, the truth evaluation of a formula r.p 
in each interpretation I is a value I(r.p) E [0, 1]. There­
fore, each formula does not induce a crisp set of inter­
pretations, but a fuzzy set of interpretations [rp], defin­
ing JL['P] (I) = I( r.p), for each interpretation I. Hence, 
to measure the uncertainty induced on a formula by 
a possibility distribution on the set of interpretations 
I we have to consider some extension of the notion 
of necessity measure for fuzzy sets, in particular for 
fuzzy sets of interpretations. In [Dubois and Prade, 
1991] the authors propose to define 
N([rp]l 7r) = inf 1r(I):::} JL['PJ(I), lEI 
where JL['PJ(I) = I(r.p) E [0, 1] and :::} is the reciprocal 
of Godel's many-valued implication, which is defined 
as x :::} y = 1 if x :S y and x :::} y 
= 
1 - x, otherwise. 
The following remarks are worth noticing. The first 
one is that this definition is indeed an extension of 
the classical definition, in the sense that we recover it 
whenever [rp] is a crisp set. The second one is that 
with this definition, the condition N([rp] I 1r) 2: a is 
equivalent to 
1r(I) :S max(1 - a, JL['P] (I)) 
for every I E I, analogously to the crisp case as well. 
And the third one is that the equivalence 
N((rp]l1r) = 1 iff 1r :S JL["'J 
is also an interesting consequence. It is not difficult to 
see that this kind of necessity measures on fuzzy sets 
is characterized by the following set of axioms: 
N1 N(D.) = 1 
N2 N(0) = 0 
N3 N(A n B) = min(N(A), N(B)) 
( N(niEIAi) = infiEI N(Ai) ) 
N4 if A is crisp, 
{ 1, if 1 - a  :S N(A) then N(A U a) =  N(A) th . , o erw1se 
Now let us go into formal definitions. 
Definition 1 (Possibilistic model) Let I be the set 
of (many-valued) Godel interpretations over a given 
language. A possibilistic model is a normalized possi­
bility distribution 1r : I - +  [0, 1] on the set of interpre­
tations I. 
Definition 2 (Possibilistic satisfaction and en­
tailment) A possibilistic model 7r : I - +  [0, 1] sat­
isfies a weighted formula ( rp, a), written 1r I= ( rp, a) , 
iff N([rp] I 1r) 2: a. Now let r be a set of weighted 
formulas. We say that r entails a weighted formula 
(rp, a), written r I= (rp, a), iff every possibilistic model 
satisfying all the weighted formulas in r also satisfies 
(rp, a). 
We propose now a Hilbert-style axiomatization2 of this 
logic: axioms of PGL (for Possibilistic Godel logic) are 
Godel logic axioms weighted by 1 plus the triviality 
axiom (rp, 0), and PGL inference rules are : 
Generalized modus ponens: 
Weakening: 
(rp-+ '1/J,a) 
(r.p,/3) 
('l/;, min(a, /3)) 
(rp,a) 
[if f3 <a] (r.p,/3) 
Then the notion of proof in PGL is as usual and it will 
be denoted as f-PG. The soundness of this axiomatic 
system is given in the next theorem. 
Theorem 1 PGL is sound with respect the possibilis­
tic entailment, i.e. iff f-PG ( rp, a) then f F ( rp, a) . 
Proof: Soundness of the axioms and the weakening 
rule is straightforward, thus we only prove the sound­
ness of the modus ponens rule. This reduces to 
check, for all possibilistic distribution 1r on I, that if 
N([r.p-+ '1/J] I 1r) 2: a and N([rp]l 1r) 2: /3, then N(['l/J] I 
1r) 2: min( a, (3). The two conditions amount to, for 
each interpretation I E I, 1r (I) :::} I ( r.p -+ '1/J) 2: a 
and 1r(I) :::} I(rp) 2: /3. Thus, 1r(I) :::} min(I(rp - +  
'1/J),I(r.p)) ;::: min(a,/3). But, by Godel semantics, 
min(I(rp - +  '1/J), I(r.p)) = min(I('l/;), I(r.p)) :S I('lf;). 
Therefore, we have that 1r(I) :::} I('lf;) 2: min(a,/3) 
for each interpretation IE I, and thus, N(['l/J] I 1r) 2: 
min( a, (3). D 
Unfortunately we have not been able so far to prove 
whether PGL is complete or incomplete. So it remains 
as an open question to be solved in the near future. 
4 A POSSIBILISTIC LOGIC 
PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE 
In the previous section we have defined PGL, a general 
possibilistic logic over the many-valued Godel logic. 
Our aim in this section is, as in classical propositional 
logic programming systems, to define a sublanguage 
2Notice the analogy with the classical Possibilistic logic 
[Dubois et a!., 1994c], here we have just replaced the ax­
ioms of classical propositional logic with those of many­
valued Godel logic. 
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for logic programming which would enable us to de­
sign an efficient proof algorithm, based on a complete 
calculus for computing the maximum degree of pos­
sibilistic entailment of a propositional variable, called 
goal, from a set of weighted formulas. 
To this end, we restrict ourselves to a Horn-rule sub­
language of the logic G, i.e. to formulas of the form: 
P1 1\ · · · 1\ Pk -+ q 
with k 2: 0, where p1, . . .  , Pk , q are propositional vari­
ables, in the traditional logic programming style. As 
usual, we shall refer to the conclusion q and the set of 
premises p1, . . .  , Pk as the head and the body, respec­
tively. We distinguish between two types of formulas 
in this sublanguage: fact when k = 0 (empty body) 
and are simply written q, and rule, otherwise. 
Definition 3 (PGL clause) A PGL clause is a pair 
of the form (£P,a), where £P is either a fact or a rule 
and a E [0, 1] is a lower bound on the belief on £P in 
terms of necessity measures. 
For PGL clauses we shall develop a simple and efficient 
calculus which will not need the whole logical appara­
tus of PGL of the previous section. But before we need 
to introduce some extra definitions and results. 
Definition 4 (Maximum degree of possibilistic 
entailment) The maximum degree of possibilistic en­
tailment of a goal q from a set of PGL clauses P, de­
noted by llqiiP, is the greatest lower bound a E [0, 1] 
on the belief on q such that P f= (q, a). Thus, 
llqiiP =sup{ a E [0, 1] 1 P f= (q, a)} . 
Theorem 2 The maximum degree of possibilistic en­
tailment of a goal q from a set of PGL clauses P is 
the least necessity evaluation of q given by the models 
of P. Thus, llqiiP = inf{N([q] l 7r) l1r f= P}. 
Proof: We define a1 = sup{ a E [0, 1] I P f= (q, a)} 
and az = inf{N([q] l1r) l1r f= P}. 
az 2: a1: As a1 = sup{ a E [0, 1] I P f= (q, a)} we 
have that P f= (q, a), for all a < a1. Then, for 
every model1r of P we have that N([q] l1r) 2: a 
for all a < a1. Thus, az = inf{N([q] l1r) l1r f= 
P} 2: a, for all a < a1, hence, az 2: a1. 
az ::; a1: As az = inf{N([q]l1r) l1r f= P} we have 
that N([q] l1r) 2: a2 for all model1r of P, that is 
P f= (q, az), and thus, az ::; sup{ a E [0, 1] 1 P f= 
(q, a)}= a1. 0 
Corollary 1 Let P be a of PGL clauses and let s be 
a propositional variable. Then, P f= (s, llsllp). 
To provide our possibilistic logic programming lan­
guage with a complete calculus for determining the 
maximum degree of possibilistic entailment we only 
need the triviality axiom and a particular instance of 
the generalized modus ponens rule introduced in the 
previous section: 
Axiom: (£P, 0) 
Generalized modus ponens: 
(Pl 1\ · · · 1\ Pk -+ q, 'Y) 
(Pl, /31), 
· 
· 
· , (pk , f3k) 
( q, min ( 'Y, /31, ... , /3 k)) 
Obviously, the axiom is a valid PGL clause and the in­
ference rule is sound as already proved in the previous 
section. 
Definition 5 (Degree of deduction) A goal q is 
deduced with a degree of deduction a from a set of 
PGL clauses P, denoted by P f-* (q, a), iff there exists 
a finite sequence of PGL clauses C1, ... , Cm such that 
Cm = (q, a) and, for each i E {1, . . .  , m}, it holds that 
Ci E P, Ci is an instance of the axiom or Ci is ob­
tained by applying the above inference rule to previous 
clauses in the sequence. 
Next, we define the syntactic counterpart of maximum 
degree of possibilistic entailment. 
Definition 6 (Maximum degree of deduction) 
The maximum degree of deduction of a goal q from 
a set of PGL clauses P, denoted lqlp, is the greatest 
a E [0, 1] such that P f-* (q,a). 
As the only inference rule of our proof method is the 
generalized modus ponens, within the framework of 
logic programming in which P is always a finite set of 
PGL clauses, there exists a finite number of proofs of 
a goal q from P, and thus, the above definition turns 
into lqlp =max{ a E [0, 1] 1 P f-* (q, a)}. 
The following propositions are needed to prove com­
pleteness. 
Proposition 1 If the only formulas in P with head q 
are recursive3, then llqiiP = lqlp = 0. 
Proposition 2 Let (p, /3) and (p -t q, 'Y) be two PGL 
clauses such that p "# q. Then, llqll{(p,/3),(p-+q,-y)} = 
min(/3, 'Y). 
Proposition 3 Let P be a set of PGL clauses and let 
(r -t q,'Y) be a clause of P. If llqiiP > llqiiP\{(r-+q,-y)}' 
then llqiiP = llqll{(r,<>r),(r-+q,-y)}> where ar = llriiP· 
Proposition 4 Let P be a set of PGL clauses and let 
(q -t p,"f) be a clause of P. It holds that llqllp = 
llqiiP\{(q-tp,-y)} 
· 
Theorem 3 (Completeness) Let P be a set of PGL 
clauses and let q be a goal. Then, llqiiP = lqlp. 
Proof: By the soundness of the modus ponens infer­
ence rule, we have llqiiP 2: lqlp. Therefore, we must 
3 A recursive formula is of the form Pl 1\ · 
· · 
1\pk 1\ q-+ q 
with k � 0. 
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prove llqiiP :::; lqlp and we proceed by induction on n, 
where n is the number of clauses of P. 
If n = 1, then it must be that P contains only either 
one certainty-weighted fact or rule. We assume that 
q occurs in P as the head of a non recursive formula; 
otherwise, by Proposition 1, we have llqiiP = lqlp = 0. 
Suppose that P contains only the certainty-weighted 
fact ( q, "'(). Let I0 and h be two interpretations such 
that Io(q) < 1- "'( and ft(q) = 1. Now, let 1r be a 
possibility distribution with the following definition: 
{ 
1, if I = I1 
1r(I) = 1 - "'f, if I = Io 
0, otherwise 
It is easy to check that 1r f= (q, "'f) and N([q] I 1r) 
"'f· Then, by Theorem 2, we have llqiiP = inf{N([qJI 
1r) I 1r f= (q,"'()} :::; "Y· Now, lqlp =max{ a E [0, 1] I 
(q,"'() f-* (q,a)} ="'(,and thus, llqiiP:::; lqlp. 
Suppose that P contains only the certainty-weighted 
rule ( r --+ q, 'Y). Let I 0 be an interpretation such that 
I0 (r) :::; I0 (q) < 1 and let 1r be a possibility distribution 
with the following definition: 
(I) { 1, if I = I0 7r = 0, otherwise 
It is easy to check that 1r f= (r --+ q, "'f) and N([qJI 1r) = 
0. Then, by Theorem 2, we have llqllp = inf{N ( [q]l 
1r) l1r f= (r--+ q,"'()} = 0, and thus, llqiiP:::; lqlp. 
Suppose now that for any set P' that contains n clauses 
it holds that llsiiP' :::; lsiP' for any propositional vari­
able s, and suppose that P contains n + 1 clauses. 
Since we are assuming that q occurs in P as the head 
of a non recursive formula, let (<.p,"'f) be a clause of 
P such that <.p is a non recursive formula with head q 
and "'( 2 8, for any clause ( 'ljJ, 8) of P such that 'ljJ is 
a non recursive formula with head q. We distinguish 
two cases: 
Case ( <.p, 'Y) = ( q, "'(). Let I0 and h be two interpreta­
tions such that I0(q) < 1 - "'( and Io(p) = 1 for 
any propositional variable p =J. q, and h ( s) = 1 
for any propositional variable s. Now, let 1r be a 
possibility distribution with the following defini­
tion: 
{ 1, if I = I1 
1r(I) = 1 - "'f, if I = Io 
0, otherwise 
Since "'( 2 8 for any non recursive clause ('1/J, 8) of 
P such that q is the head of 'ljJ, we have that 1r f= P 
and N([q]l 1r) = 'Y· Therefore, by Theorem 2, we 
have llqiiP = inf{N([qJ I 1r) I 1r f= P} :::; "Y· Now, 
lqlp =max{ a E [0, 1] I P f-* (q,a)} 2 "'(,and 
thus, llqiiP :::; lqlp. 
Case (<.p,"'f) = (p--+ q,"'(). If we define P' = P\{(p--+ 
q, "'()} we have that llqiiP 2 llqiiP'· 
If llqiiP = llqiiP', by the induction hypothesis, we 
have that llqiiP' :::; lqiP', and thus, llqiiP :::; lqiP· 
If llqiiP > llqiiP', by Proposition 3, llqiiP = 
llqll{(p,ap),(p--+q,7)}, where ap == IIPIIP, and, by 
Proposition 2, llqll{(p,ap),(p--+q,7)} = min(ap, "'f). 
Now, by Proposition 4, IIPIIP = IIPIIP' and, by the 
induction hypothesis, IIPIIP' :::; IPIP'· Since IPIP' :::; 
IPIP and (p--+ q, "'f) E P, applying the modus po­
nens inference rule, we get P f-* (q, min(IPIP, "'f)) 
with min(IPIP, "'f) 2 min (ap, "'f). Then, lqlp = 
max{ a E [0, 1]1 P f-* (q, a)} 2 min(IPIP, "'f), and 
thus, lqlp 2 min (ap, "Y) = llqiiP· D 
In the particular case that we do not allow recursive 
formulas in the language, the underlying uncertainty 
logic of our logic programming system is syntactical 
equivalent to the family of infinitely-valued proposi­
tional logics the interpreter defined in [Escalada-Imaz 
and Manya, 1995] can deal with. The interpreter is 
based on a backward proof algorithm for computing 
the maximum degree of deduction of a propositional 
variable from a set of formulas whose worst-case time 
complexity is linear in the total number of occurrences 
of propositional variables in the set of formulas. We 
show bellow an example of PGL clauses the interpreter 
can deal with. 
Example 1 The maximum degree of deduction of the 
goal friend_M ary_J ohn from the set of clauses 
P={ (M ary_is_young, 0.8), 
(John_is_young, 0.9), 
(Mary _is_young 1\ J ohn_is_young --+ 
friend_M ary_John, 0.6) }, 
is 0.6 which corresponds with the deduction degree 
computed by the interpreter when taking as triangular 
norm the min -conjunction function and as implication 
Godel's many-valued implication function. 
5 ADDING FUZZY UNIFICATION 
Our aim is to extend the calculus of our possibilistic 
language to allow a semantical matching between fuzzy 
propositional variables based on a necessity evaluation 
of fuzzy events. For instance, given the set of PGL 
clauses 
P={ (M ary_is_young, 0.8), 
(John_is_aboutr6, 0.9), 
(Mary_is_young 1\ John_is_young--+ 
friend_M ary_John, 0.6) }, 
where John_is_young and John_is_about16 are two 
fuzzy propositional variables, the maximum degree of 
deduction of the goal friend_M ary_John from P is 0 
unless we be able to compute the necessity evaluation 
of the propositional variable John_is_young from the 
fact that the propositional variable John_is_about16 is 
certain with a necessity of at lest 0.9. 
To tackle the fuzzy unification problem within our pos­
sibilistic framework we are lead (i) to fix a domain 
and an interpretation of fuzzy propositional variables 
6 UNCERTAINTY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROCEEDINGS 2000 
in terms of its membership functions, otherwise we 
would not be able to identify when two propositional 
variables A and B are related and, furthermore, we 
would not be able to reason about the certainty of 
the propositional variable B from the fact that the 
domain-related propositional variable A is certain with 
a necessity of at least o:; and (ii) to define some mea­
sure to compute the necessity evaluation of a fuzzy 
propositional variable B based on a domain-related 
fuzzy propositional variable A. 
5.1 PROPOSITIONAL VARIABLES WITH 
FINITE DOMAINS 
With respect the underlying uncertainty logic de­
scribed in Section 2, the main difference is that now 
we attach propositional variables with a sort. In doing 
so, we are introducing a minor change in the seman­
tics. Many-valued interpretations should map a sort 
into a non-empty domain and a propositional variable 
into a value of its domain, and thus, in turn we need 
to provide a new notion of interpretation. 
A more rigorous approach should be to define a first­
order language with typed regular predicates and 
sorted fuzzy constants (cf. [Alsinet et al., 1999]) which 
would allow us to represent, for instance, the fuzzy 
statement "Mary is young" as age(M ary, young). 
However, since variables and function symbols are not 
allowed in the language, fuzzy propositional variables 
give us a more simple representation model without 
lost of expressiveness. 
Definition 7 (Extended many-valued interpre­
tation) An interpretation I= (U, i, m) maps: 
1. each sort a into a non-empty domain U,; 
2. all propositional variables p of sort a into a same 
value i(p) E U,; and 
3. a propositional variable p of sort a into a (nor­
malized} fuzzy set m(p): U, --t [0, 1]. 
Notice that an interpretation I = (U, i, m) is disjunc­
tive in the sense that i(p) is a unique value of the 
domain U, for any propositional variable p of sort a, 
and i(p) =/:. i(p') iff p and p' are of different sorts. 
In what follows, we shall denote by J.Lm(p) the member­
ship function of m(p). The truth value of a proposi­
tional variable p under an interpretation I= (U, i, m), 
denoted by I(p), is computed as 
I(p) = J.Lm(p)(i(p)). 
These truth evaluations extend to rules in the usual 
way by using the truth functions described in Sec­
tion 2. 
Remark that the truth value of a propositional vari­
able p under an interpretation I = (U, i, m) depends 
not only on the value i(p) assigned to p, but on the 
fuzzy set m(p). Therefore, in order to measure the 
certainty of a sorted propositional variable in a possi­
bilistic model we cannot take into account any possible 
interpretation, but only those which share a common 
interpretation of propositional variables, and hence 
which also share their domain. This leads us to de­
fine the notion of context (cf. [Alsinet et al., 1999]) 
Definition 8 (Context) Let U be a collection of 
non-empty domains and let m be an interpretation 
of propositional variables over U such that for every 
propositional variable p there exist u, v E U,, a being 
the sort of p, such that J.Lm(p)(u) = 0 and J.Lm(p)(v) = 1. 
We define the context determined by U and m, denoted 
by 'Iu,m, as the set of extended many-valued interpre­
tations having U as domain and m as interpretation 
of propositional variables. Thus, 
'Iu,m = {IE 'I I I= (U, i, m)}, 
where 'I denotes the set of all extended many-valued 
interpretations. 
Remark that given a context 'Iu,m and a proposi­
tional variable p, there exist at least two interpreta­
tions Io,l1 E 'Iu,m such that Io(p) = 0 and h (p) = 1. 
Let us briefly discuss the reason for defining the notion 
of context by means of an example. 
Example 2 Let age_M ary_around19 be a proposi­
tional variable of sort M ary_years_old and let Io = 
(U, i, mo) and h = (U, i, m1) be two interpretations 
such that 
• UMary_years-old = [0, 120](years), 
• i(age_Mary_around19) = 20, 
• mo(age_Mary_aroundlg) = [17; 18; 20; 21]-trape­
zoidal fuzzy set4- and 
• m1 (age_M ary_around19) = [18; 19; 19; 20]. 
Although the age of Mary is the same value in both 
interpretations, we have a different truth value in each 
interpretation depending on the membership function 
of the fuzzy set assigned to the propositional variable. 
Thus, 
Io(age_Mary_aroundlg) = J.L[l7;1B;20;21](20) = 1 
and 
Il(age_Mary_aroundlg) = J.L[l8;19;19;20J(20) = 0. 
Then, for instance, the possibility distributions 1r that 
satisfy the PGL clause 
(age_M ary_around1g, 1) 
are those such that 1r(I0) � 1 and 1r(h) = 0, and thus, 
Io can be fully plausible while h is inadmissible, how­
ever, Mary is twenty years old in both interpretations. 
4We represent a trapezoidal fuzzy set as [t1; tz; t3; t4], 
where the interval [h, t4] is the support and the interval 
[tz, t3] is the core. 
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Therefore, when fixing a particular context we are en­
suring that belief states modeled by normalized possi­
bility distributions on a set of possible interpretations 
(or possible states) are consistent, in the sense that 
possible states are sharing a common view of the real 
world. 
Finally, the notion of possibilistic satisfaction can be 
easily extended in a particular context Iu,m in the fol­
lowing way. Given a context Iu,m, the models of a 
set of PGL clauses P are the normalized possibility 
distributions on the set of extended many-valued in­
terpretations Iu,m that satisfy all the clauses in P. 
5.2 EXTENDED INFERENCE WITH 
POSSIBILISTIC PATTERN 
MATCHING 
To provide PGL with a semantical matching mecha­
nism we need a measure for computing the necessity 
evaluation of the propositional variable B based on 
the domain-related propositional variable A. Further­
more, this measure should enable us to include new in­
ference patterns in our previous calculus of Section 4 in 
order to keep completeness for determining the maxi­
mum degree of possibilistic entailment of a goal form 
a set of PGL clauses in a particular context. 
Again there are several alternatives. After a careful 
analysis we have chosen the same type of measure 
used when defining the possibilistic semantics for PGL. 
Namely, given a context Iu,m, the necessity evaluation 
of B based on the domain-related propositional vari­
able A is defined as 
N(m(B) I m(A)) = inf f.-Lm(A)(u) =? f.-Lm(B)(u), uEU� 
where =? is the reciprocal of Godel's many-valued im­
plication. 
At this point we are ready to extend the calculus 
to allow a semantical matching of propositional vari­
ables with finite domains through a possibilistic pat­
tern matching measure based on a necessity evaluation 
of fuzzy events. Although there may exist several ap­
proaches, we have finally decided to extend the calcu­
lus with three inference rules. Given a context Iu,m, 
these inference rules are defined as follows: 
Semantical unification: 
(p, a) [SU ] 
(p', min( a, ;3)) 
' 
where ;3 = N(m(p') I m(p)). 
Intersection: 
(Pl, a), (p2, ;3) [I N] 
(p',min(a,;3)) 
' 
if f.-Lm(p') ;::: min(f.-Lm(p,)' f.-Lm(p2))· 
Resolving Uncertainty: 
(p, a) [U N] 
(p'' 1) 
' 
if f.-Lm(p') ;::: max(1- a, f.-Lm(p))· 
Theorem 4 The SU, IN and UN inference rules are 
sound in a context Iu,m with respect to the possibilistic 
entailment of PGL clauses. 
Proof: Soundness of the IN and UN rules is straight­
forward, thus we only prove the soundness of the SU 
rule. We must prove that for all possibilistic distri­
bution 7r : Iu,m -+ [0, 1], if 7r I= (p, a) then 7r I= 
(p',min(a,;3)), where ;3 = N(m(p') I m(p)). Assume 
that 7r I= (p, a). This means that, N([P] I  1r) ;::: a, and 
thus, 1r(I) =? I(p);::: a, for all interpretation IE Iu,m· 
Then, we have the following consecutive inequalities: 
1. 1r(J) =? f.-Lm(p)(i(p)) 2 a 
2. min( 1r(I) =? f.-Lm(p) ( i(p)), 
f.-Lm(p)(i(p)) =? 1-Lm(p')(i(p')));::: 
min(a, f.-Lm(p) ( i(p)) =? f.-Lm(p') (i(p'))) 
3. min(1r(I) =? J..lm(p)(i(p)), 
f.-Lm(p) ( i(p)) =? /-Lm(p') ( i(p'))) � 
7r(I) =} f.-Lm(p')(i(p')) 
4. 1r(I) =? f.-Lm(p')(i(p'));::: 
min(a, f.-Lm(p) ( i(p)) =? f.-Lm(p') ( i(p'))) 
5. inflEiu,m 1r(J) =? f.-Lm(p')(i(p'));::: 
infiEiu,m min(a,f.-Lm(p)(i(p)) =? f.-Lm(p')(i(p'))) 
6. inflEiu,m 1r(I) =? f.-Lm(p')(i(p'));::: 
min(a,infiEiu,m f.-Lm(p)(i(p)) =? f.-Lm(p')(i(p'))) 
7. N([p'] l1r) ;::: 
min(a,infuEU� f.-Lm(p)(u) =? f.-Lm(p')(u)) 
8. N([p'] l1r) ;::: min(a, N(m(p') I m(p))) 
Thus, 7r I= (p' , min(a , N(m(p') I m(p)))) as well. D 
Moreover, for a given a context Iu,m, the modus­
ponens style calculus extended with the SU, IN and 
UN inference rules is complete for determining the 
maximum degree of possibilistic entailment of a goal 
from a particular class of PGL clauses called well­
formed and satisfiable PGL programs. The formaliza­
tion of the notion of well-formed and satisfiable PGL 
program and the proof of completeness for this class 
of PGL clauses can be found in [Alsinet and Godo, 
2000b]. 
Example 3 Let John_is_about16, John_is_14_16 and 
J ohn_is_16_18 be three propositional variables of sort 
John_year s_old, and let Iu,m be a context such that 
• U J ohn_years-old = [0, 120] (yearS), 
• m(John_is_aboutl6) = [14; 16; 16; 18], 
• m(John_is_14_16) = (12; 14; 16; 18] and 
• m( J ohn_is_16_18) = (14; 16; 18; 20]. 
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Now, given the set of PGL clauses 
we have that 
P={ (John_is_14_16, 1), 
(John_is_16_18, 1) }, 
N(m(John_is_abouh6) I m(John_is_14_16)) = 0 
and 
N(m(John_is_aboutl6) I m(John_is_16_18)) = 0. 
However, each model 1r : Iu,m -+ [0, 1] of P verifies 
that 
1r(I) ::=; min(J(John_is_14_16), I(John_is_16_18)), 
for all I E Iu,m. Therefore, because of the three 
propositional variables have the same domain, we 
have that i (John_is_14_16) = i (John_is_16_18) = 
i(John_is_aboutl6), for all IE Iu,m· Then, because of 
this particular interpretation m of propositional vari­
ables, 
7r(I) :::; JLm(John_is_aboutl6) ( i (  J ohn_is_aboutl6) ), 
for all I E Iu,m· Hence, P f= (John_is_aboutl6, 1), 
and thus, 11John_is_about16IIP = 1. On the other 
hand, applying the IN rule to (John_is_14_16, 1) and 
(John_is_16_18, 1) we deduce (John_is..aboutl6, 1), 
and thus, 1John_is_abouh61P = 11John_is_abouh611P· 
6 RELATED WORK 
The introduction of fuzzy constants in logic program­
ming languages was suggested in the early eighties by 
[Cayrol et al., 1982] and [Bel et al., 1986] with the 
aim of including fuzzy values in a pattern matching 
procedure. Subsequently, [Umana, 1987] defined a 
fuzzy pattern matching process using the extension 
principle for one and two variate functions, and in 
[Baldwin et al., 1995] the authors implemented a se­
mantic unification procedure based on the theory of 
mass assignments which allows a unified framework for 
the treatment of fuzzy and probabilistic data. [Godo 
and Vila, 1995] proposed a possibilistic-based logic to 
deal with fuzzy temporal constraints based on many­
valued semantics and a necessity-like measure to allow 
a pattern matching mechanism between fuzzy tempo­
ral constraints. [Virtanen, 1998] defined a fuzzy unifi­
cation algorithm based on fuzzy equality relations and 
[Arcelli et al., 1998] proposed three different kinds of 
unification in the fuzzy context: the first one is based 
on similarity relations, the second one identifies sim­
ilar objects through an equivalence relation and the 
last one uses "semantic constraints" for defining a 
more flexible unification. More recently, [Gerla and 
Sessa, 1999] formalized a methodology for transform­
ing an interpreter for SLD Resolution into an inter­
preter that computes on abstract values which express 
similarity properties on the set of predicate and func­
tion symbols of a classical first-order language and 
[Formato et al., 2000] extended the unification algo­
rithm of Martelli-Montanari to allow a partial match­
ing between crisp constants through similarity rela­
tions. Finally, [Dubois et al., 1998] proposed an exten­
sion of possibilistic logic dealing with fuzzy constants 
and fuzzily restricted quantifiers (called PLFC), and 
[Alsinet et al., 1999] provided PLFC logic with a for­
mal semantics and a sound resolution-style calculus by 
refutation. 
The main differences between this framework and 
PLFC [Alsinet et al., 1999] are (i) at the level of the 
syntax and semantics of the language, (ii) at the level 
of providing the language with a complete calculus, 
and (iii) at the level of defining a semantical unifica­
tion mechanism between fuzzy propositions. 
In PLFC, formulas are pairs of the form (<p(x), f (Y)), 
where x and y denote sets of free and implicitly uni­
versally quantified variables and y ;2 x, <p(x) is a dis­
junction of literals with fuzzy constants, and f (Y) is a 
valid valuation function which expresses the certainty 
of <p(x) in terms of necessity measures. Basically, val­
uation functions f (Y) are constant values and vari­
able weights which are not considered in our possibilis­
tic language. Variable weights [Dubois et al., 1994a; 
1994b] are suitable for modeling statements of the form 
"the more x is A (or x belongs to A), the more certain 
is p(x)", where A is a fuzzy set. This is formalized in 
PLFC as, for all x, "p(x) is true with a necessity of at 
least JLA(x)", and is represented as (p(x), A(x)). When 
A is imprecise but not fuzzy, the interpretation of such 
a formula is just "Vx E A, p(x)". So A acts as a (flexi­
ble if it is fuzzy) restriction on the universal quantifier. 
On the other hand, fuzzy constants in PLFC can be 
seen as (flexible) restrictions on an existential quanti­
fier. In general, "L(B) is true at least to degree o:", is 
represented in PLFC as (L(B), o:), where L is either 
a positive or a negative literal and B is a fuzzy set. 
For instance, if B is imprecise but not fuzzy, (p(B), o:) 
and (•p(B),o:) have to be read as "3x E B, p(x)" and 
"3x E B, •p(x)", respectively. 
Therefore, because of the calculus for PLFC is defined 
by refutation through a generalized resolution rule be­
tween positive and negative literals, the unification (in 
the classical sense) between fuzzy constants is not al­
lowed. For instance, from 
s1: (•p(A) V '1/J, 1) and s2: (p(A), 1), 
which, if A is not fuzzy, are interpreted respectively as 
"(3x E A, •p(x)) V 'l/J" and "3x E A, p(x)", 
we can infer '1/J iff A is a precise constant. However, 
a semantical unification between fuzzy events is per­
formed through variable weights and fuzzy constants. 
For instance, from 
s1: (•p(x) V '1/J(x), A(x)) and s2: (p(B), 1), 
which, if A and B are not fuzzy, are interpreted re­
spectively as 
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"Yx E A, •p(x) V 7/J(x)" and "3x E B, p(x)", 
we infer (7/J(B), N(A I B)), where N(A I B) is a neces­
sity evaluation of fuzzy events. 
In our current setting, fuzzy propositional variables 
are interpreted in the same way as fuzzy constants in 
PLFC but, in contrast to PLFC, we do not have nega­
tive literals in the language and we have provided the 
language with a complete modus ponens-style calcu­
lus for determining the maximum degree of possibilis­
tic entailment of a propositional variable from a set 
of formulas which can be extended, through a seman­
tical unification inference rule, to allow a semantical 
matching between propositional variables. 
Concerning the semantics, because of the fuzzy in­
formation, the truth evaluation of formulas is many­
valued in both languages, and belief states are mod­
eled by normalized possibility distributions on the set 
of many-valued interpretations, also in both languages. 
However, the basic connectives of PLFC are negation • 
and disjunction V while in our language, they are con­
junction 1\ and implication -+, and the semantics for 
the two sets of connectives are not equivalent, i.e. the 
two sets of connectives are not inter-definable. More­
over, the extended necessity measure for fuzzy sets 
suggested by Dubois and Prade in [Dubois and Prade, 
1991], which is used in this language for setting the 
possibilistic semantics of formulas, is different from the 
one used in PLFC, although both are extensions of the 
standard necessity measure for crisp sets. 
Finally, the proof method for PLFC is based on refu­
tation through a resolution rule, a fusion rule already 
proposed in [Dubois et al., 1998] and a merging rule. 
During the proof process, the merging rule must be ap­
plied after every resolution step, and thus, the proof 
algorithm cannot be oriented to a resolvent clause and 
therefore, the search space consists of all possible or­
derings of the literals in the input program. In con­
trast, in our current setting, the proof method is ori­
ented to propositional variables (goals) and can be 
performed in a bottom-up manner through a general­
ized modus ponens inference rule. In particular, when 
the semantical unification between fuzzy propositional 
variables is emulated by means of the following non­
logical axiom 
(p-+ p', N(m(p') I m(p))), 
we can easily adapt the interpreter proposed in 
[Escalada-Imaz and Manya, 1995] for computing 
N(m(p') I m(p)) in a particular context. However, 
as we have seen, this approach is not powerful enough 
for determining the maximum degree of possibilistic 
entailment of a goal q from a set of PGL clauses P.  
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